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W ORKMEN's COMPENSATION - ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION -The deceased, a structural steelworker, was employed to dismantle an abandoned drawbridge which spanned a navigable river. At the time of the accident, he was
examining steel which had been cut from the bridge and lowered into a barge
used to haul it to the storage point and from this barge "he either fell or was
knocked into the river." The company which employed him was a contributor
to the Washington Compensation Fund,1 a compulsory act for employers engaged in the type of work for which the deceased had been employed. In this
proceeding the widow appealed on writ of certiorari from a decision in which
the Washington Supreme Court 2 held that she could not, consistently with the
federal Constitution, recover an award under the state compensation law for the
death of her husband. The opinion of the Washington court was based on the
ground that .to allow the state law to operate in this case would work material
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law. Held, the
state court is reversed. In view of the difficulty involved in formulating any
guiding, definite rule to determine the extent and limits within which state laws
. may validly provide compensation for employees injured on navigable waters, the
courts will rely "heavily" on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the

1 Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington, 1932), §§ 7674, 7693a. The act applies to "all
employees or workmen . . . engaged in maritime occupations for whom no right or
obligation exists und7r the maritime laws." The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Act, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U. S. C. (1940), § 901 et seq., applies only "if re_covery . . . may not validly be provided by state law." Both acts, therefore, show
clearly that neither was intended to intrude into the field occupied by the other.
2 Lower court decision, 12 Wash. (2d) 349, 121 P. (2d) 365 (1942).
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state enactments and in each case presume that the jurisdiction in which the
action is brought is the correct one. Davis v. Department of Labor t1nd Industries of State of Washington, 317 U.S. 249, 63 S. Ct. 225 (1942).
For a quarter of a century the uncertainties and complexities inherent in the
so-called uniformity rule 3 have plagued both federal and state courts, indicating
that it is virtually impossible to determine with exactness w4en, as the rule provides, state legislation is unconstitutional because its application "works material
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law." 4 This rule
began its turbulent career, when in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,5 the Supreme
Court declared that state workmen's compensation could not, consistently with
the requirement of uniformity, be extended to stevedores injured on navigable
waters. Numerous cases, however, decided both before and after the Jensen
decision have recognized the necessity and convenience of permitting state laws
to apply to many matters of a maritime nature. Some of these intrusions have
been justified under the saving clause 6 of the Judicial Act of 1789 7 and others
by virtue of a relatively new principle, the "doctrine of local concern." 8 In
1917,9 just five months after the Jensen decision, and again in 1922 10 an attempt was made by congressional amendment to bring state workmen's compensation laws within the saving clause. In each case the effort was declared unconstitutional.11 Grant Smith-Porter Ship-Co. v. Rohde,12 however, established that in certain instances where the subject matter of the employment is
3 The rule was established in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37
S. Ct. 524 (1917). Numerous articles have discussed this doctrine, including: Cunningham, "Is Every County Court in the United States a Court of Admiralty?" 53
AM. L. REv. 749 (1919); Dodd, "The New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Admiralty
over the Common Law," 21 CoL. L. REv. 647 (1921); FELL, RECENT PlloBLEMS IN
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION (1922) (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in Historical and
Political Science, Ser. 40, No. 3); Palfrey, "The Common Law Courts and the Law
of the Sea," 36 HARV. L. REv. 777 (1923); Wright, "Uniformity in Maritime Law,"
73 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 123, 223 (1925); Morrison, "Workmen's Compensation and
the Maritime Law," 38 YALE L. J. 472 (1929); Conlen, "Ten Years of the Jensen
Case," 76 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 926 (1928).
4 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 at 216, 37 S. Ct. 524 (1917).
6 Id.
6 Cooleyv. Board of Wardens, 12 How. (53 U.S.) 299 (1851); Morgan's Louisiana & T. R. & S.S. Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455, 6 S. Ct. I I 14
(1886); Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 522, (1872); Western Fuel Co.
v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 42 S. Ct. 89 (1921); Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U.S. 410,
23 S. Ct. 472 (1903); Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 7 S. Ct. 313 (1886).
7 Judiciary Act of 1789, I Stat. L. 76. Cf. Rev. Stat. (1874), § 563, and 28

U. S. C. (1940), § 41.
8 Established in Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, 42 S. Ct.
157 (1922). See Hatch, "The 'Maritime' Twilight Zone from the Standpoint of Compensation Administration," I I AM. LAB. LEG. REV. 148 (1921).
9 40 Stat. L. 395 (1917), 28 U.S. C. (1940), § 41 (3).
10 42 Stat. L. 634 (1922), 28 U.S. C. (1940), § 41 (3).
11 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 40 S. Ct. 438 (1920);
Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 44 S. Ct. 302 (1924).
12 257 U.S. 469, 42 S. Ct. 157 (1922).
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essentially of local concern the application of state law will not interfere with
the proper harmony and uniformity of the maritime law. When a state could
and when it could not extend the protection of it~ compensation laws to employees injured on navigable waters became, by the Rohde decision, a perplexing
problem which turns upon the somewhat nebulous doctrine of local concern.18
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act 14 merely perpetuated this
jurisdictional difficulty by making the federal law applicable only if recovery
could not validly be provided by state law.15 This much seems to be definite: if
the accident occurred on navigable waters and the subject matter of the employment is maritime, then the state laws are excluded; 16 but if the accident
occurred on land 11 or if the character of the employment is of local concern,18
then the state laws may validly apply and the federal act is inoperative. The
greatest difficulty arises in determining when the character of the employment
is of local concern. By the Jens en decision, basic conditions are factual and since
they are necessarily jurisdictional facts, an appeal from the findings of ·either
state or federal compensation commissions. entitles the appellant to a trial de novo
upon these facts. 19 The burden thus placed upon the tribunals and litigants is
manifest. Before bringing his action, the employee must determine with certainty factual questions over which the courts themselves are in substantial disagreement, and in case of error he may not only suffer financial loss but discover
13 See Horowitz, "How Far Workmen's Compensation Acts Can Apply to Maritime Law," l 9 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL AssoCIATION OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS, II9 (1933) (Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 577).
14 44 Stat. L. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S. C. (1940), §§ 901-950.
15 See supra, note l.
16 Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U. S. 142, 49 S. Ct. 88 (1928);
Wheeler Shipyard v. Lowe, (D. C. N. Y. 1935) 13 F. Supp. 863; Robins Dry Dock
& Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449, 45 S. Ct. 157 (1925); John Baizley Iron Works
v. Span,-281 U. S. 222, 50 S. Ct. 306 (1930); Moore Dry Dock Co. v. Pillsbury,
(C. C. A_. 9th, 1938) 100 F. (2d) 245. See also Motor Boat Sales v. Parker, (C. C. A.
4th, 1941) n6 F. (2d) 789.
17 Admiralty has no jurisdiction in such cases.
18 Johnson v. Swonder, 84 Ind. App. 155, 150 N. E. 615 (1926); Madderns v.
Fox Film Corp., 205 App. Div. 791, 200 N. Y. S. 344 (1923); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Bacon, 30 Ga. App. 728, 119 S. E. 458 (1923); United Dredging Co. v. Industrial
Comm., 92 Cal. App. IIO, 267 P. 763 (1928); In re Herbert, 283 Mass. 348, 186
N. E. 554 (1933); Dewey Fish Co. v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 181 Wash. 95,
41 P. (2d) 1099 (1935); Jones v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 252 App.
Div. 347, 300 N. Y. S. 238 (1937); McBride v. Standard Oil Co., 196 App. Div.
822, 188 N. Y. S. 90 (1921); Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S., 469,
42 S. Ct. 157 (1922).
19 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 at 55, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1931), stated: "Not
only is navigability itself a question of fact, as waters that are navigable in fact are
navigable in law, but, where navigability is not in dispute, the locality of the injury,
that is, whether it has occurred upon the navigable waters of the United States, determines the existence of the congressional power to create the liability prescribed by the
statute."
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that his claim in the proper forum has been barred by the statute of limitations.20
Such a situation is intolerable in a field where definite, speedy and inexpensive
remedies are so highly desirable. To cope with this situation, the court in the
principal case adopts a well-recognized doctrine which has been applied elsewhere
in our law when the interests of two jurisdictions clash. It relies heavily on the
presumption of constitutionality in favor of state legislation by resolving all
doubts in favor of the act. 21 Similarly, when a federal commission has taken
jurisdiction there is a presumption in favor of its findings if supported by sufficient
evidence. 22 While these presumptions undoubtedly benefit the employee, they
place a greater burden upon the employer, since in doubtful cases he may be
held accountable under either the federal or the state acts and must, therefore,
comply with both. Indeed, it would seem that so long as the Jens en decision is
followed, and perhaps even if it is overruled, either the employee or the employer must suffer the burden of determining in each case with which jurisdiction he should comply. The court in the principal case feels that it is more nearly
equitable to place the_ burden upon the employer since he is the one best able to
sustain it. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Stone indicated that, while he
was entirely sympathetic with any effort to lessen the uncertainties and complexities which have resulted from the Jensen decision, any solution which
creates a "dual system of presumptions" and construes the state and federal acts
so that their coverage overlaps is clearly neither permissible nor practicable. His
objections to t4e majority opinion are threefold: first, it is logically absurd that
two mutually exclusive jurisdictions should overlap; secondly, it places an undue
burden upon the employer; and thirdly, it controverts the express terms of the
federal statute. He also pointed out that the Court would find itself in a very
embarrassing situation if both jurisdictions were to deny their authority to grant
compensation and the Court were compelled to presume both were correct. The
majority of the Court, however, indicated that they are not entirely satisfied
with their solution and will in the future lend sympathetic consideration to any
plan devised to eliminate this unfortunate situation, even though it involves
overruling the Jens en decision.
Arthur B. Lathrop

See dissent in principal case.
South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 58
S. Ct. 510 (1938); Southern Ry. v. King, 217 U.S. 524, 30 S. Ct. 594 (1910);
Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U.S. 158, 39 S. Ct. 35 (1918).
22 Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U.S. 244, 62 S. Ct. 221 (1941).
20
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